Ghana stands as a beacon of democratic stability in West Africa, a region too often scarred by coups and authoritarian rule. We take just pride in our peaceful transfers of power and our vibrant political discourse. Yet, beneath this proud surface, a constitutional flaw—an inherited relic of our political system—slowly erodes the very foundations of our governance. This is the seemingly anachronistic practice of appointing the majority of Ministers of State from the sitting Parliament.
This fusion of executive and legislative functions, a feature of the Westminster model we adopted, creates a fundamental conflict of interest that weakens accountability, stifles genuine deliberation, and concentrates power in a manner that is increasingly incompatible with a mature democracy. The critical question we must confront is not if, but how long, our democracy can thrive under this inherent contradiction.
The Illusion of Checks and Balances
The 1992 Constitution, in its wisdom, established three separate arms of government—the Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary—to act as checks on one another. The Legislature, in particular, is designed to be the people’s watchdog, scrutinizing the Executive, approving the national budget, and ensuring that the government remains accountable to the citizenry.
However, this crucial check collapses when the very people who are supposed to be scrutinized are the scrutineers. When a majority of ministers, including the most senior ones, are drawn from Parliament, the House is effectively neutered. Backbenchers from the ruling party, eyeing a future ministerial portfolio, are disincentivized from asking tough questions. The majority side of the House transforms from a legislative body into a cheering squad for the Executive’s agenda. The rigorous debate that should characterize a healthy democracy is replaced by a predictable rubber-stamp process.
The Abdication of Constituency Duty
This fusion creates a crisis of representation. A Member of Parliament who doubles as a Minister faces an impossible dual loyalty. Their primary duty as an MP is to their constituents—to voice their concerns, advocate for their development, and hold the executive accountable on their behalf.
But as a Minister, their loyalty is sworn to the President and the Cabinet. They are bound by collective responsibility to defend government policy, even when it is detrimental to their own constituents. How can an MP-Minister effectively criticize a poorly designed policy that they helped create? How can they summon the courage to speak truth to power when they are part of that power? The result is that constituents in the constituencies of MP-Ministers are often left without a true advocate in the legislature. Their representative is, first and foremost, a representative of the Executive.
The Strain on Governance and Deliberation
The practical consequences are also severe. The roles of an MP and a Minister are each demanding full-time jobs. An MP must attend parliamentary sittings, participate in committee work, and be constantly present in their constituency. A Minister is tasked with managing a complex ministry, formulating policy, and overseeing a vast bureaucracy.
Combining these roles leads to burnout and divided attention. It is common to see near-empty parliamentary chambers during important debates because MP-Ministers are attending to their executive duties. This deprives Parliament of the experience and insight of some of its most senior members during critical legislative work. Furthermore, it weakens the effectiveness of the ministries, as the minister’s attention is perpetually split.
A Call for Constitutional Reform: The Way Forward
Ghana’s democracy has matured beyond the need for this colonial-era holdover. The argument that there is not enough talent outside Parliament to fill ministerial positions is an insult to the vast pool of competent technocrats, academics, and professionals across the country. A government that draws ministers from a wider talent pool would likely be more effective and innovative.
The solution is a clear and decisive constitutional amendment to separate these powers. We must move towards a system that:
- Prohibits sitting MPs from holding ministerial office. This would allow MPs to focus on their core duties of legislation and oversight without executive influence.
- encourages the appointment of ministers based on expertise, not just political loyalty. This would lead to better-designed and more effectively implemented policies.
- Strengthens the committee system in Parliament. With a clear separation, parliamentary committees could become powerful, non-partisan bodies for genuine scrutiny, much like the system in the United States.
This is not a call for revolution, but for evolution. It is a call to strengthen our democracy by untangling a conflict of interest that has persisted for too long. The longevity of our democratic thrive should not be left to chance or the goodwill of politicians. It must be intentionally engineered through robust institutions.
The fusion of executive and legislative powers is a knot that ties the hands of our democracy. It is time for a national conversation on untying it. Our democracy has thrived not because of this system, but in spite of it. To ensure it continues to thrive for generations to come, we must have the courage to reform the very structures that govern us. The health of our nation depends on creating a Parliament that is truly independent, effective, and accountable solely to the people of Ghana.